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Abstract -The systematic review methodology has been employed to review trust related studies in cloud 
computing. It was observed that trusted computing technologies and reputation based approaches are the main 
approaches to trust engineering in cloud computing. Also, trusted third party approaches and the deployment model 
play a significant role in enhancing trust between service providers and consumers. It was observed that the concept of 
trust is used loosely without any formal specification in cloud computing discussions and trust engineering in general. 
As a first step towards addressing this problem, we have contextualized the formal trust specification in multi-agent 
environments for cloud computing.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This introductory section begins with the motivation 
for undertaking this study. Next, a background to the 
need for trust engineering in cloud computing is 
provided. An overview to opportunistic cloud services 
(which is the foundation for the motivation of this study) 
is also given. Since the methodological approach to this 
study is systematic literature review, the section ends 
with a brief introduction to systematic literature reviews 
and the processes involved in conducting such a review.  
1.1 Motivation 
We have over the past three years been working on 
the feasibility of Opportunistic Cloud Services (OCS) for 
enterprises[1] [2]. One of the major challenges that such a 
platform faces is data security and trust management 
issues. In order to design and develop a trust management 
system for OCS platforms, we needed to review the 
current trust engineering issues in cloud computing. It 
was decided that we needed to perform a systematic 
literature review on this topic because since the OCS 
concept is itself new, any trust design models of its 
subsystems must be guided by exhaustive knowledge of 
the state-of-the-art in the field. The rigorous 
methodological approach offered by systematic literature 
reviews will ensure that the topic is adequately covered. 
The objective of this paper is therefore to provide state-
of-the-art knowledge on trust engineering concepts and 
models in cloud computing.  
1.2 Background to Trust in Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing is essentially the packaging of 
traditional Information Technology infrastructure and 
software solutions such as storage, CPU, network,  
applications, services, etc., as virtualized resources and 
delivered by a service provider to its customers as an on-
demand pay-per-use self-provisioned service, which is 
normally offered through a web portal over a network 
such as the Internet[3] [4] [5]. While cloud service 
providers pledge to preserve data privacy, the current 
Software as a Service (SaaS) architecture makes it 
difficult to provide any assurance that the software in the 
Cloud will not be able to make copies or redistribute the 
data it used[6] . Secondly, the Cloud model is based on 
two key characteristics: multi-tenancy, where multiple 
tenants share the same service instance, and elasticity, 
where tenants can scale the amount of their allocated 
resources based on current demands. Although both 
characteristics target improving resource utilization, cost 
reduction, and service availability, these gains are 
threatened by multi-tenancy security implications. The 
sharing of applications that process critical information 
without sufficient proven security isolation, security 
SLAs or tenant control, results in “loss-of-control” and 
“lack-of-trust” problems[7].  
Apart from these consumer concerns, cloud 
architectures also introduce new classes of security risks 
and attacks over the resources of cloud service providers. 
These include poisoned virtual machines, attacks against 
the cloud service provider’s management console, attacks 
based on knowledge of default security settings, abuse of 
billing systems, and data leakage via uniform resource 
locators.  Cloud service providers still do not currently 
have sufficiently robust technical solutions that can 
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protect their cloud resources from harmful malware, virus 
infection, botnets, distributed denial of service attacks, or 
other types of cyber-attacks. Furthermore, there is no 
effective mechanism to help cloud users evaluate the 
security measures of their service providers and ensure 
the protection of their data while taking into 
consideration industry standards or personal preferences 
[8]. 
1.3 Opportunistic Cloud Services 
Opportunistic Cloud Services (OCS) is a social 
network approach to the provisioning and management of 
cloud computing services for enterprises. OCS is about 
enterprises leveraging free cloud services to meet their 
business needs without having to pay or paying a minimal 
fee for these services [9][10]. An OCS network is a social 
network of enterprises collaborating strategically for the 
contribution and usage of cloud services without entering 
into any business agreements[1]. Members normally will 
package only their spare IT resources and make them 
available as Cloud services on the OCS platform so that 
others interested can utilize them. Since no business 
agreement and hence no Service Level Agreement (SLA) 
exist between the service providers and the potential users 
of their services, service consumers do not enjoy the level 
of support (in terms of quality of service, reliability, 
availability, security, billing transparency, etc.) that 
commercial cloud service providers offer to their clients. 
Considering the fact that commercial cloud service 
providers are finding it extremely challenging to provide 
such a support, coupled with having to provide adequate 
transparency in their management processes, the OCS 
platform more so needs a well-crafted and soundly 
engineered trust management system in order to make 
resources on the platform suitable for business use.  
1.4 Systematic Literature Reviews 
A systematic literature review is a means of 
identifying, evaluating and interpreting all available 
research - that are known to the researcher - and relevant 
to a particular research question,  topic area, or 
phenomenon of interest [11][12]. It is a systematic, 
explicit, comprehensive, and reproducible method for 
identifying, evaluating, and synthesizing the existing 
body of completed and recorded work produced by 
researchers, scholars, and practitioners on a specific topic 
of interest [13]. The accumulation of evidence through 
secondary studies can be very valuable in offering new 
insights or in identifying where an issue might be 
clarified by additional primary studies. The systematic 
literature review process consists of three main stages -
namely inputs, processing, and outputs [14]. The eight 
step guide of  [13] to conducting systematic literature 
review are: purpose of the literature review, protocol and 
training, searching for the literature, practical screen, 
quality appraisal, data extraction, synthesis of studies, 
and  finally writing the review. They recommend all these 
steps are essential for a review to be scientifically 
rigorous. According to[11] the stages in a systematic 
literature review can be summarized into three main 
phases: planning the review, conducting the review, and 
reporting the review. The stages associated with planning 
the review are: identification of the need for a review, 
specifying the research questions, and developing a 
review protocol; the stages associated with conducting 
the review are: identification of relevant existing 
research, selection of primary studies, study quality 
assessment, data extraction and monitoring, and data 
synthesis; and finally, the stages associated with 
reporting the review are: specifying dissemination 
mechanisms, and formatting the main report.  
2 METHODOLOGY  
We adopt a blend of the guidelines of [11] and [13] 
because after a careful analysis,  we consider both guides 
to be suitable for our purpose; and it was evident that 
their main individual stages are in agreement and refer to 
the same concepts with slightly different tagging.   
2.1 Planning the Review 
The main activities involved in planning the review 
are specifying the objectives of the study, specifying the 
research questions, developing and evaluating the review 
protocol, and justifying the need for the study. 
2.1.1 Need for the Study 
There have been efforts on surveys on security issues 
in cloud computing [15] [16] but not on trust engineering. 
Also, even though security is a key element of trust, these 
studies are not systematic reviews and those that attempt 
a systematic review such as [17] focus only on security; 
so to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first 
attempt of summarizing the body of knowledge on trust 
engineering in cloud computing environments. 
2.1.2 Objectives and Research Questions 
The first of the main objectives of this study is to 
provide state-of-the-art knowledge on trust engineering 
concepts and models in cloud computing. The second 
objective is to provide a firm grounding for engineering a 
trust model and trust management system for 
opportunistic cloud computing services. Based on these 
objectives, the research questions that are of interest to 
this study are: 
a. What are the main approaches towards trust 
engineering in cloud computing? 
b. What are the major trust models and trust 
management systems for cloud computing? 
c. What are the objectives of the identified primary 
studies and in what contexts are these trust 
management systems being developed? 
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2.1.3  Review Protocol 
A review protocol specifies the methods that will be 
used to undertake a specific systematic review. The 
components of a protocol include all the elements of the 
review plus some additional planning information such as 
the project timeline [11]. The entire methodology section 
in this paper gives a summary of review protocol that has 
been applied in undertaking this study. The review 
protocol has been under constant re-evaluation to ensure 
that the applied search strings are derived from the 
research questions; the extracted data properly address 
the research questions; and the data analysis procedure is 
appropriate to answer the research questions. 
2.2 Conducting the Review 
The stages associated with conducting the review are 
identification and selection of relevant existing primary 
studies, study quality assessment, data extraction and 
monitoring, and data synthesis. 
2.2.1 Search Strategy 
The adopted search strategy is to search for keywords 
in standard metadata (i.e. title, abstract, and author 
keywords). The keywords derived from our topic “Trust 
Engineering in Cloud Computing” are trust, engineering, 
and cloud computing. However, because privacy and 
security are two major elements in trust in cloud 
computing, we expanded our search keywords to include 
them. Additionally, to ensure the search strings are 
derived from our research questions, we further expand 
the keywords to include model. We then use a 
combination of two or more of the resulting keywords as 
search strings in searching for the primary resources for 
this study. The resulting search strings are: trust 
engineering, trust cloud computing, trust model, security 
in cloud computing, privacy in cloud computing, security 
engineering, and privacy engineering.  
2.2.2 Sources 
Considering the topic of this study, the major sources 
that the search strategy was applied in are IEEE Xplore 
Digital Library, ACM Digital Library, Google scholar, 
and Journals of Elsevier and Springer Link. These 
sources were supplemented with the general Internet and 
the Aalborg University digital library portal, Primo, 
which is a portal into well-known research databases. 
2.2.3 Practical Screen and Quality Appraisal 
Refworks [18] was used as the bibliographic 
management tool for managing the large number of over 
five hundred studies resulting from the search process. 
These were taken through practical screening by reading 
through their abstracts and those that didn’t have relation 
to our research topic were excluded; leaving about 320 
primary studies as our base resources. A second and a 
third round of reviews were performed to select those that 
had direct bearing on the research questions. This process 
yielded about 140 articles that have been included in this 
study. All these articles were then retrieved and 
processed for the data extraction phase. This process 
spanned a period of four months, from September to 
December 2012. Regular update to the list of articles was 
made during data extraction and synthesis of studies 
phases in the subsequent months of undertaking this 
study.  
2.2.4 Data Extraction 
NVivo10[19] was the choice of tool for the data 
extraction phase. Even though we are well aware of other 
qualitative data analysis tools such as Atlas.ti [20], we 
did not consider them since the university had license to 
only NVivo.  All these relevant primary studies were 
manually read. The basic methodological steps of 
constant comparison for coding in grounded theory [21] 
[22]were applied in the data extraction process with help 
of Nvivo in the coding of the data as we read through 
each article. Furthermore the grounded theory 
methodology allowed extraction of relevant information 
(e.g. the major challenges of trust engineering in cloud 
computing) from the primary studies, even though these 
were not initially part of the focus of our study and hence 
did not reflect in our research questions.  
2.2.5 Synthesis of Studies 
During the synthesis stage, major trends that had 
developed during the coding process were further 
investigated by searching for new articles on these 
specific topics in order to shed more light on them. We 
followed an iterative process of categorization and 
reorganization of the extracted data, supplemented with 
finding new articles that support or weaken the trends 
being observed. Those categories lacking adequate 
support and could also not fit naturally under other 
categories did not merit further analysis and were 
dropped in our discussions as is presented below.    
3 ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION 
We have followed an iterative process of 
categorization and reorganization of the extracted data, 
supplemented with finding new articles that support or 
weaken the trends being observed, in order to obtain the 
final headings that are discussed in this section. The main 
areas covered in our analyses and discussions are:  
 Trust, security and privacy challenges in cloud 
computing 
 Focus on trust engineering in cloud computing 
 Modeling trust: this deals with the modeling of 
the concept of trust. 
 Trust engineering approaches 
 Trust management systems  
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3.1 Trust, Security and Privacy Challenges in 
Cloud Computing 
Though the identification of challenges in cloud 
computing was not part of the research objectives or 
questions that were spelt out during the “Planning the 
Review” stage, it was evident during the data extraction 
process that it is a paramount issue that needed some 
attention. The major challenges in cloud computing as 
were reported by the reviewed papers can be categorized 
into trust challenges, security challenges, and privacy 
challenges. This categorization however does not mean 
the categories are mutually exclusive, as it will be seen 
later that for example, security and privacy issues impact 
upon the perceived trust of various entities in a cloud 
computing marketplace.  
3.1.1 Trust Challenges 
An important issue in cloud computing is the 
accountability of the resource usage data: who performs 
the measurement to collect resource usage data – is it the 
provider, the consumer, a trusted third party or some 
combination of them? Currently, provider side 
accountability is the basis for cloud service providers, 
although, as yet there are no equivalent facilities of 
consumer-trusted metering as is the case in traditional 
utility services; rather, consumers have no choice but to 
take whatever usage data made available by the provider 
as trustworthy [23]. 
Another issue concerning trust in cloud computing is 
that, potential customers of cloud services often feel that 
they lose the control over their data, and they are not sure 
whether they can trust the cloud service providers. A 
survey conducted in 2011 among more than three 
thousand cloud consumers from six countries, shows that 
84 percent of the consumers are concerned about their 
data storage location and 88 percent of the consumers 
worry about who has access to their data. Though 
consumer concerns can be mitigated by using preventive 
measures for privacy (e.g., demonstrating compliance 
standards) and security (e.g., secure hypervisors, TPM 
based servers), at present, cloud providers demonstrate 
their preventive measures by including related 
descriptions in the SLAs; assurances and compensations 
for SLA violations are however not convincing enough 
for the consumers. Especially, SLAs with vague clauses 
and unclear technical specifications lead the consumers 
into a decision dilemma when considering them as the 
only bases to identify trustworthy providers [24]. 
A third issue concerning trust in cloud computing is 
that, the SaaS model gives software providers an 
unprecedented access to data uploaded by users. At 
execution time the control of the data is handed over from 
the user (data owner) to the software provider. 
Furthermore, the results generated from the software 
execution, in theory, are under the control of the software 
provider. This raises a new concern about trust on 
software providers [6]. Data must be decrypted into 
memory when performing the computation, even though 
they can be encrypted during storage and transmission. In 
this case, the privileged administrators of SaaS providers 
are able to inspect or modify users’ data and 
computations. As a result, the users are hesitant to trust 
the SaaS providers [25]. 
3.1.2 Security Challenges  
Possible misuse of customers’ data by cloud service 
providers is a major challenge in cloud computing. The 
privileged administrators of cloud service providers are 
able to inspect, modify, or misapply users’ data and 
computations. Some of the security challenges facing 
cloud computing are multi-tenancy security implications, 
security isolation, cloud service providers’ and 
customers’ need of modeling and enforcing different 
security requirements (especially at runtime because 
security requirements may change over time as new risks 
emerge), and integrating with different security services. 
After analyzing the cloud computing model security 
problem, and information security management systems 
(ISMS) process, [26] has identified the following key 
problems: 
 Each stakeholder has their own security 
management process (SMP) that they want to 
maintain or extend to the cloud hosted assets.  
 No stakeholder can individually maintain the 
whole security process of the cloud services 
because none of them has the full information 
required to manage security and each one has a 
different perspective.  
 Multi-tenancy requires maintaining different 
security profiles for each tenant on the same 
service instance.  
 No Security SLA is available that can be used to 
maintain agreements related to cloud assets 
security.  
 The existing standards such as ISO27000 and 
FISMA do not map well to the cloud model 
because these standards consider the SMP from 
the perspective of the platform/asset owner, not 
from a service provider perspective. 
 
While there might be a multitude of operating systems 
(OSs) deployed in a single cloud, the majority of such 
OSs have not been designed for the Cloud. In particular, 
traditional logging is process and/or event-based (for a 
particular user or node). In the Cloud, however, there are 
no clear user or node barriers; instead, logging should be 
done with respect to the key assets, i.e., data and 
information. In terms of OSs, this means data-centric 
logging. Besides provenance, other key concerns 
mandating data- centric logging include the need for 
support of consistency assurance, rollback, recovery, 
replay, backup, and restoring of data. Such functionality 
is usually enabled by using operational and/or 
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transactional logs. Such logs have also been proven 
useful for monitoring of operational anomalies. While 
these concepts are well established in the database 
domain, cloud computing’s characteristics such as 
eventual consistency, ‘unlimited’ scale, and multi-
tenancy pose new challenges. In addition, secure and 
privacy-aware mechanisms must be devised not only for 
consistency logs but also for their backups, which are 
commonly used for media/node recovery [27]. 
Data processing clouds, including Hadoop[28], 
execute untrusted, user-submitted code on trusted cloud 
nodes during job processing, and must therefore remain 
vigilant against malicious mobile code attacks. 
Virtualization technologies, including trusted hardware, 
hypervisors, secure operating systems, and trusted VMs 
are the typical means by which such mobile code is 
secured. However, a variety of studies have shown that 
clouds introduce significant new security challenges that 
make mobile code security a non-trivial, ongoing battle. 
For example, the Cloud Security Alliance has identified 
insecure cloud APIs, malicious insiders, shared 
technology issues, service hijacking, and unknown risk 
profiles all as top security threats to cloud services [29]. 
Adopting multi-tenancy with SaaS results in a set of 
requirements that must be addressed by the SaaS 
application. Two key requirements in the area of SaaS 
applications’ security engineering have been identified by 
[7]. The first one is the security isolation among tenants’ 
assets at rest (storage), during processing (in memory), 
and during transient (among application components or 
between the application and the tenant site). Secondly, it 
is required to support enforcement of different security 
requirements on the same service instance at runtime. 
Application customization approaches do not fit well 
with runtime and multi-tenant specification and security 
enforcement because these security requirements may 
change over time as new risks emerge. 
 Data integrity is another major security challenge for 
cloud computing. It is most often assumed that the 
underlying storage arrays (similar technologies of which 
are being employed by cloud service providers), receive, 
store and retrieve data flawlessly. This assumption is 
however proven to be false in the past, as evident from 
the CERN report[30] and other studies[31]. Therefore, 
prompt detection of integrity violations is vital for the 
reliability and safety of the stored data in the Cloud [32]. 
3.1.3 Privacy Challenges 
In cloud computing, entities may have multiple 
accounts associated with a single or multiple service 
providers (SPs). Sharing sensitive identity information 
(i.e. Personally Identifiable Information (PII)) along with 
associated attributes of the same entity across services 
can lead to mapping of the identities to the entity; and 
this is leads to privacy loss. The major problems 
regarding privacy in the Cloud include how to secure PII 
from being used by unauthorized users; how to prevent 
attacks against privacy (such as identity theft) even when 
a cloud SP cannot be trusted; and how to maintain control 
over the disclosure of private information [33]. 
As has been indicated by [34], there are situations 
where cloud service providers themselves invade the 
privacy of their users, so a cloud service provider is 
generally not the entity to fully rely on in order to protect 
one’s privacy. Consequently, there is a need for 
additional external measures to protect a user’s privacy. 
This need has been recognized in several previous 
approaches for protecting data in the Cloud [35] [36]. 
However, these approaches suffer from bad usability and 
require too much effort from the users, as shown for 
example by Whitten and Tygar [37] and subsequent user 
tests. There are theoretically many cryptographic 
mechanisms that would perfectly suit the privacy needs 
of today’s Internet users, but their use is avoided due to a 
lack of good usability and high effort required. For 
example, Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) burden the 
users with handling cryptographic artifacts. Although 
there are many efforts to simplify the usage of a PKI ,e. 
g. [38] [39], the majority of users still shy away from the 
extra work [34]. 
3.2 Cloud Computing Trust Engineering Focus  
We now analyze the main objectives of researchers on 
trust engineering in cloud computing to determine what 
trust engineering research has focused on within the past 
few years. We extract the objectives of selected works of 
which the objectives had been clearly stated (normally 
stated in the abstract or in the introductory sections), or 
can be easily inferred from these sections.  We have 
identified five main research focuses on trust engineering 
in cloud computing. They are performance and Quality of 
Service (QoS), security related, access and Identity 
management, user and provider support on trust 
management, and billing and accountability. We end the 
section with some concluding remarks on some of the 
salient points of these research areas together with the 
context within which these studies had been carried out. 
3.2.1 Performance and QoS 
The objective of the trust evaluation model of [40] is 
to configure the complex set of services dynamically in a 
cloud environment according to the predictive 
performance in terms of stability and availability of all 
services that are to be provided; this is with the aim of 
allowing a system to configure services dynamically and 
distribute tasks efficiently in such a way that minimizes 
task failure and task migration rate. 
 Success of cloud computing requires that both 
customers and providers can be confident that signed 
SLAs are supporting their respective business activities to 
their best extent. The SLAs currently being used fail in 
providing such confidence, especially when providers 
outsource resources to other providers. These resource 
providers typically support very simple metrics like 
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availability, or metrics that hinder an efficient 
exploitation of their resources. A resource-level metric 
for specifying fine-grain guarantees on CPU performance 
has been proposed by [41]. 
Due to the dynamic nature of cloud computing, how 
to achieve satisfactory QoS in cloud workflow systems 
becomes a challenge. Meanwhile, since QoS 
requirements have many dimensions, a unified system 
design for different QoS management components is 
required to reduce the system complexity and software 
development cost;[42] has therefore proposed a generic 
QoS framework for cloud workflow systems. The 
framework covers the major stages of a workflow 
lifecycle. It consists of QoS requirement specification, 
QoS-aware service selection, QoS consistency 
monitoring and QoS violation handling. 
3.2.2 Security  
The aim of [43] is to provide a system that makes it 
possible to detect that at least the configuration of the 
cloud infrastructure -as provided in the form of a 
hypervisor and administrative domain software- has not 
been changed without the customer’s consent. They 
present a system that enables periodical and necessity-
driven integrity measurements and remote attestations of 
vital parts of cloud computing infrastructures. The 
objective of [43] is to tackle the problem of protecting 
entities using the Cloud from malicious or negligent 
entities providing the cloud infrastructure. They present 
the BonaFides system for remote attestations of security-
relevant parts of the cloud infrastructure, which 
guarantees to service providers at runtime the detection of 
unintended or malicious modifications of cloud 
infrastructure configurations. Their approach does not 
prevent the cloud infrastructure provider from altering 
crucial components and subsequently stealing data, but 
these activities will at least be detected by the cloud 
consumers. 
The objectives of [25] is to provide a trusted SaaS 
platform (TSP) which will guarantee data security during 
storage and transmission, and also enforce a trusted 
execution environment (TEE) that guarantees the 
confidentiality and integrity of the users’ data and 
computations. The objective of [7] is to provide a security 
management architecture- Tenant Oriented SaaS Security 
Management Architecture (TOSSMA) - that allows 
service providers to enable their tenants in defining, 
customizing and enforcing their security requirements 
without having to go back to application developers for 
maintenance or security. The objective of [32] is to offer 
a secure cloud storage service architecture with the focus 
on Data Integrity as a Service (DIaaS) based on the 
principles of Service-Oriented Architecture and Web 
services. The approach releases the burdens of data 
integrity management from a storage service by handling 
it through an independent third party data Integrity 
Management Service (IMS); it also reduces the security 
risk of the data stored in the storage services by checking 
the data integrity with the help of IMS. 
In order to address privacy and security issues, and to 
incorporate security and trust functionalities that 
complies with EU and government privacy laws, [44] has 
presented the Cloud Data Security (CloudDataSec) 
project that aims to design cloud services adhering to 
government privacy laws. In particular, they introduced a 
six-layer security model for cloud computing and three 
level of security assurance for SMEs to take advantage 
of. Finally, they proposed Security Management as a 
Service (SMaaS) modules to enable users to apply 
necessary security and privacy operations, based on the 
sensitivity of their data. 
The objective of  [26] is to introduce a cloud security 
management framework based on aligning the FISMA 
standard[45][46] to fit with the cloud computing model; 
this is with the aim of enabling cloud providers and 
consumers to be security certified through improving 
collaboration between cloud infrastructure providers, 
cloud service providers and service consumers in 
managing the security of the cloud platform and the 
hosted services. 
3.2.3 Access and Identity Management 
Because available solutions to identity management in 
cloud computing use trusted third party (TTP) in 
identifying entities to service providers, and these 
solution providers do not recommend the usage of their 
solutions on untrusted hosts, the objective of [33] is to 
develop a framework for identity management which is 
independent of TTP and has the ability to use identity 
data on untrusted hosts. The objective of [47] is to 
provide a mechanism (Trust Ticket) of ensuring trust and 
security in Software as a Service (SaaS). Their Trust 
Ticket, together with the supporting protocols, is a 
mechanism that helps a data owner in establishing a link 
between a cloud service provider and a registered user. In 
this mechanism, a user first gets registered with a data 
owner before receiving a Trust Ticket and a secret key 
from that data owner. Each Trust Ticket is unique and 
encrypted. On completing the registration of each user, 
the data owner apprises the cloud service provider of the 
Trust Ticket.  
3.2.4 User and Provider Trust Management Support 
Due to the vast diversity in the available cloud 
services, from the customers’ point of view, it has 
become difficult to decide whose services they should use 
and what the basis for their selection is. Currently, there 
is no framework that can allow customers to evaluate 
Cloud offerings and rank them based on their ability to 
meet the user’s QoS requirements. Reference [48] has 
proposed a framework and a mechanism that measures 
the quality and prioritizes cloud services. The objective 
of [24] is to support the customers in reliably identifying 
trustworthy cloud providers. The objective of  [49] is to 
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provide personalized trust management in which the user 
may play any of the three roles of consumer, broker, or 
provider. The objective of  [50] is to provide decision 
making guidance to service providers to initialize 
collaborations by selecting trustworthy partners within 
the context of a cloud marketplace. 
The objective of [51] is to provide a framework that 
enable trust-based cloud customer and cloud service 
provider interactions within the context of hybrid cloud 
computing environments. The objective of  [27] is to 
employ a data-centric, detective approach to provide a 
framework (TrustCloud) to increase trust, security of 
data, and accountability in the Cloud at all levels of 
granularity. The aim of [34] is to provide usable 
confidentiality and integrity, through their Confidentiality 
as a Service (CaaS) paradigm for the majority of users for 
whom the current security mechanisms are too complex 
or require too much effort. 
3.2.5 Billing and Accountability 
The objective of [23] is to provide openness and 
transparency . They propose the notion of consumer–
centric resource accounting model such that consumers 
can programmatically compute their consumption 
charges of a remotely used service. In particular, the 
notion of strongly consumer–centric accounting model is 
proposed that requires that all the data needed for 
calculating billing charges can be collected independently 
by the consumer (or a trusted third party, TTP).  
According to [8], one of the major security obstacles 
to widespread adoption of cloud computing is the lack of 
near-real-time auditability. In particular, near-real-time 
cloud auditing, which provides timely evaluation results 
and rapid response, is the key to assuring the Cloud. 
Their objective is therefore to present strategies for 
reliable cloud auditing. 
3.2.6 Concluding Remarks and Contexts of Studies 
Usually, cloud providers provide assurances by 
specifying technical and functional descriptions in SLAs 
for the services they offer. The descriptions in SLAs are 
not consistent among the cloud providers even though 
they offer services with similar functionality. Customers 
are not sure whether they can identify a trustworthy cloud 
provider only based on its SLA. To support the customers 
in reliably identifying trustworthy cloud providers, [24] 
has proposed a multi-faceted trust management system 
architecture for a cloud computing marketplace. The 
context of  [50] is the provision of guidance in the 
selection of trustworthy partners within a cloud 
computing marketplace. The context of [51] is to provide 
a framework that enable trust-based cloud customer and 
cloud service provider interactions within the context of 
hybrid cloud computing environments, where resource 
sharing between multiple Clouds to meet cloud user 
requirements are enabled by peering arrangements 
established between the participating Clouds. The context 
of [40] is the scheduling of resources of services in cloud 
computing environments by adopting a trust model based 
on Probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis (pLSA) which 
analyzes the history information of each node and 
allocates reliable resources according to user requests. 
Based on the findings from the above, the main 
arrears of trust engineering research focus has been on 
quality of service, security, access and identity 
management, user support on trust management, and 
accountability in in the context of a cloud computing 
marketplace . A major observation that I made from the 
reviewed studies is that the concept of trust is treated 
loosely without any formal specification or definition in 
the discussion of trust in cloud computing and trust 
engineering in general. Formal trust modeling and 
definitions are however very necessary in ensuring a 
unified view of the concept of trust in the design and 
engineering of trust management systems for cloud 
computing; this therefore deserves more attention from 
the cloud computing research community.    
3.3 Modeling Trust 
Reference [52] has carried out a survey on the trust 
management systems implemented on distributed systems 
with a special emphasis on cloud computing. They 
reported on several trust models such as CuboidTrust [53] 
, EigenTrust [54] , Bayesian Network based Trust 
Management (BNBTM) [55], GroupRep [56] , 
AntRep[57] , Global Trust[58] [59] , Peer Trust [60], and 
Trust Ant Colony System (TACS)[61]. These models 
were mainly proposed for systems like clusters, grids and 
wireless sensor networks, and have not been used or 
tested in cloud computing environments. Secondly, these 
models do not model the concept of trust but rather model 
practical trust management systems for distributed 
systems and their algorithms for acquiring and computing 
trust values. 
This section is about the actual modeling of the 
concept of trust with a special focus on trust in cloud 
computing. We begin with looking at some definitions of 
trust and move on to obtaining a formalized model of the 
definition of the concept of trust in the context of cloud 
computing environments.   
3.3.1 Definitions of Trust  
Though there has been some work on trust modeling 
and trust management systems, and even in the new 
domain of trust management systems for cloud 
computing environments [62] [51] [63], the subjective 
nature of trust has made a solid definition elusive. 
Researchers have most often used the term loosely in 
their works; more specifically, a rigorous formal 
definition has not been applied in most cases. A few of 
the attempts at the definition of trust in the domain of 
trust engineering for cloud computing that was found 
during this study corroborates this observation.  Salah 
and Eltoweissy  [49] defined trust as the belief or 
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disbelief of a party that another party, for a said subject of 
trust, in a given context, has the intent, integrity, results 
and capability to exhibit a set of acceptable actions in the 
future, for the welfare of the trusting party. Viriyasitavat 
and Martin  [64] has developed trust definition in the 
application domain of service workflows. They defined 
trust as “Trust is a subjective mutual measurable between 
interacting entities willing to act dependably, securely, 
and reliably, in a given situation within specific context 
of a given time”. Their definition is an adaptation of that 
of Olmedilla, et al [65] which states that “Trust of a party 
A to a party B for a service X is the measurable belief of 
A in that B behaves dependably for a specified period 
within a specified context (in relation to service X)”.  It 
should be noted that whilst in the domain of service 
workflows, being able to establish trust in both directions 
is crucial, as one service may need to verify 
trustworthiness of a subsequent service before passing 
information, and the subsequent service perhaps requires 
trust that an outcome must be originated from a trusted 
source, the definition of Viriyasitavat & Martin 
contradicts the generally accepted asymmetry property of 
trust relationships.  
Dellarocas’ definition of trust [66] is adopted in this 
work. Its salient points are summarized below and 
explained in the context of cloud computing.  
The level of trust  sc iT t of a service consumer c for a 
service provider s  in the context of a transaction it T is 
the a priori probability that the utility of c will meet or 
exceed its minimum threshold of satisfaction 
0u at the 
end of transaction
it , given 'c s perceived trustworthiness 
of service provider s . Simply stated, trust is the level of 
confidence of c that the outcome of a transaction with 
another agent s  will be satisfactory for it. More formally:  





c i c i
U R u
T t R t dR

  , where ( )cU R  is the 
utility function of service consumer c ; and  ,sc iR t - the 
trustworthiness of service provider s  as perceived by 
consumer c  in the context of a transaction it T is the a 
priori subjective joint probability distribution function of 
the critical rating vector  sc iR t  from the perspective 
of c . 
It is not only cloud service consumers that need the 
consideration of trust in their transactions with the cloud 
service providers. Most often than not, cloud services 
providers also need to be wary of the activities of cloud 
service consumers. Thus, trust modeling is useful in the 
analysis of the genuine and potentially malicious service 
consumers. Therefore a trust model is needful for the 
perceived trustworthiness of service consumers by the 
providers of the services. So similarly, the level of 
trust  cs iT t of a service provider s for a service consumer 
c  in the context of a transaction it T is the a priori 
probability that the utility of s will meet or exceed its 
minimum threshold of satisfaction 
0u at the end of 
transaction
it , given service provider s perceived 
trustworthiness of service consumer c . Again, more 





s i s i
U R u
T t R t dR

  , where ( )sU R  is 
the utility function of service provider s ; and  ,cs iR t - 
the trustworthiness of service consumer c  as perceived 
by service provider s  in the context of a transaction 
it T is the a priori subjective joint probability 
distribution function of the critical rating vector  cs iR t  
from the perspective of s . Please note that it is for 
notational simplicity that the critical rating vectors 
 sc iR t  and  
c
s iR t are denoted by R (without the full 
complement of the subscripts) in the denotation of the 
trustworthiness. 
The above definitions have a number of interesting 
properties which correspond with the intuitive properties 
of trust in our everyday life such as trustworthiness is 
subjective, and it is defined relative to a particular set of 
critical attributes; trustworthiness is defined at a given 
point in time, and it is defined as a probability 
distribution. Some other important intuitive attributes of 
trust are that trust has duality - it is subjective and 
objective; that is, some of the critical attributes are 
subjectively measureable and others are objectively 
measureable; trust is not always symmetrical; and trust is 
dynamic, that is, trust is related to environment (context) 
and temporal factors [67].  
3.3.2 Cloud Computing Parameters of Trust 
When selecting a cloud service provider, multiple 
important parameters that are of relevance to the cloud 
service consumer need to be identified properly. Also, 
there is need for mechanisms to measure those 
parameters and aggregate these measurements based on 
the customers’ preference regarding the importance of the 
parameters[68]. Ref. [69] and [68] have identified several 
of these parameters which have been categorized into 
quality of service related, security and privacy related, 
risk management related, and reputation related 
attributes. These parameters (attributes) are termed 
critical attributes; more formerly, a critical attribute of a 
service provider s , from the perspective of a service 
consumer c , in the context of a transaction it T is an 
attribute whose value affects the utility of c and is 
contingent upon the behavior of s  in the course of 
transaction it [66].  A non-exhaustive list of selected set of 
the potential critical attributes in cloud services are 
briefly outlined below under each of these categories. 
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3.3.2.1 Quality of Service Related Attributes 
International Telecommunication Union has defined a 
methodology for capturing the quality requirements of a 
user of communication services which uses seven general 
criteria [70].  This view is modified in [71] by adding 
capability, usability, and fidelity - as a supplement to 
accuracy. Each of these generic aspects can be applied at 
different stages of the SLA lifecycle, and are applicable 
to cloud services. They therefore remain useful 
dimensions along which to classify cloud services [72]. 
The QoS related elements are performance metrics such 
as latency, availability, accuracy, reliability, and 
capability [72]. These metrics have also been emphasized 
by [48] and also asserted by [73] to be part of their ten 
common denominators that must be considered to make 
cloud storage valuable.   
3.3.2.2 Security and Privacy Related Attributes 
Some of the security and privacy related parameters 
that are pertinent to cloud consumers and cloud service 
providers are data confidentiality and integrity, federated 
identity management solutions, secure authentication and 
session management, and secure cryptographic 
mechanisms. Other prevalent vulnerabilities in state-of-
the-art cloud computing offerings that cloud consumers 
are wary of include SQL injection, command injection 
and cross-site scripting. Some of the security parameters 
that are more pertinent to cloud services providers are 
key management, physical security support, network 
security support, unauthorized access to management 
interface, and internet protocol vulnerabilities.   
3.3.2.3 Risk Management Related Attributes 
Some of the risk management related factors that are 
of  importance to cloud consumers are standardized SLA 
with unambiguous guarantees, near-real time auditing 
services [8] and visibility into the security controls and 
processes employed by the service provider as well as 
their performance over time that offer transparency,  
compliance (accreditation or certification), security 
measures, interoperability, customer support facilities, 
geographical location of cloud storage (data protection 
laws and other jurisdictional implication of where data is 
stored), and cloud service deployment models.  
3.3.2.4 Reputation Related Attributes 
Reputation related parameters form some of the 
potential critical attributes that users consider in selecting 
cloud services. Some of these parameters are 
recommendation from existing users of the service, 
feedback and publicly available reviews of the specific 
cloud services, category of the service and reputation of 
the cloud service provider.  
3.3.2.5 General Cloud Metrics of Trust 
In addition to the cloud specific attributes, some 
general attributes that are dependent on the activities of 
an entity to be trusted are of relevance for our discussion. 
The four main attributes of this category are intent, 
integrity, capability and results. Intent constitutes 
information about declared agendas (what parties promise 
to provide through their services), integrity constitutes 
information about honesty (if parties deliver what they 
promised), capability constitutes information about 
owned or outsourced resources, and results constitute 
information about products  they are specialized in [49].  
3.4 Trust Engineering Approaches 
The various major approaches towards trust 
engineering in cloud computing is presented in this 
section. It should be evident to readers that any research 
work that targets one or more of the trust attributes (or 
other related trust attributes) discussed in Section 3.3.2 
above contributes to trust engineering in cloud 
computing. We identify two broad categories based on 
whether it is targeted towards benefiting cloud service 
consumers or the cloud service providers. The identified 
major approaches to trust engineering in cloud computing 
are cloud audit based, reputation based, trusted third party 
based, trusted computing technology based, and cloud 
services deployment based approaches.   
3.4.1 End User Support Oriented Trust Engineering 
This is about mechanisms that facilitate building 
cloud consumers’ trust in choosing and managing cloud 
service usage. 
3.4.1.1 Cloud Audit Approaches  
Reference [23] has proposed the notion of a 
Consumer–centric Resource Accounting Model for a 
cloud resource. An accounting model is weakly 
consumer-centric if all the data that the model requires 
for calculating billing charges can be queried 
programmatically from the provider. Further, an 
accounting model is strongly consumer–centric if all the 
data that the model requires for calculating billing 
charges can be collected independently by the consumer 
(or a TTP); in effect, this means that a consumer (or a 
TTP) should be in a position to run their own 
measurement service. They contend that it is in the 
interest of the providers to make their accounting models 
at least weakly consumer-centric. Strongly consumer–
centric models should prove even more attractive to 
consumers as they enable consumers to incorporate 
independent consistency or reasonable checks as well as 
raise alarms when apparent discrepancies are suspected in 
consumption figures. Strongly consumer-centric 
accounting models have the desirable property of 
openness and transparency, since service users are in a 
position to verify the charges billed to them. 
One of the most common groupings or layers in cloud 
computing is the view of IaaS, PaaS and SaaS. These 
abstractions layers are mainly system-centric. In contrast, 
the TrustCloud framework takes a different perspective, 
i.e., an architectural, data-centric view. Because of the 
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scale of cloud computing, the types of data-centric logs 
range from system-level file-centric logs to workflow-
level audit trail logs. The TrustCloud framework attempts 
to describe the layers of cloud accountability. The five 
abstraction layers of the types of logs needed for an 
accountable cloud are system layer – addresses tracking 
of files across the Cloud, data layer – addresses tracking 
of change of data and information across the Cloud, 
workflow layer – addresses data and information flow in 
the Cloud, law and regulations layer – addresses data-
centric logging requirements mandated by external laws 
and regulations, and finally, policies layer – addresses 
data-centric audit requirements mandated by internal 
governance and audit requirements [27]. 
3.4.1.2 Reputation Based Approaches 
Reference [51] presents a fully distributed framework 
that enable trust-based cloud customer and cloud service 
provider interactions. The framework aids a service 
consumer in assigning an appropriate weight to the 
feedback of different raters regarding a prospective 
service provider. They developed a mechanism based on 
their framework for controlling falsified feedback ratings 
from iteratively exerting trust level contamination due to 
falsified feedback ratings. 
Secure integrity attestation of computation results is 
the focus of [29]. Whereas AdapTest [74] and RunTest 
[75] implement cloud service integrity attestation for the 
IBM System S stream processing system [76] using 
attestation graphs in which always-agreeing nodes form a 
clique in the graph, facilitating detection of malicious 
collectives; in contrast, the work of [29] considers a 
reputation-based trust management approach to integrity 
violation detection in Hadoop clouds. Trust management 
systems probabilistically anticipate future misbehavior of 
untrusted agents based on their histories of past behavior. 
3.4.1.3 Trusted Third Party Based Approaches 
The goal of [43] is the remote assessment of the cloud 
infrastructure’s integrity by a cloud certifier. They hence 
need to detect all changes in the remote system that can 
possibly compromise security. All changes in the 
hardware or software should be reported to the cloud 
certifier, even if the infrastructure provider has super-user 
access to the machine. Their BonaFides system monitors 
the infrastructure provider’s physical hosts by observing 
file modifications on a low level and persistently stores 
the history of these integrity measurements and file 
changes. Files are measured at regular intervals and 
whenever changes in the files are detected. BonaFides 
measures the hypervisor, kernel, kernel modules, disk and 
network utilities, and system configuration files in the 
Dom0 (the administrative domain of the Xen hypervisor 
that manages access to the physical host’s resources). 
3.4.1.4 Trusted Computing Technology Base Approaches 
Ref. [77] has presented a multi-tenancy trusted 
computing environment model (MTCEM) to support the 
security duty separation between Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP) and customers. MTCEM is designed for IaaS 
service delivery model, and it intends to separate the 
security responsibility of the CSP and their customers on 
cloud infrastructures. In MTCEM model, CSP is 
responsible to assure a trusted host and Virtual Machine 
Monitor (VMM) environment, and customers are 
responsible for the assurance of trusted virtual instances 
they rent from CSP.  MTCEM uses the two main 
mechanisms of transitive trust and platform attestation of 
the trusted computing technology.  It uses transitive trust 
mechanism to build a trusted computing platform and 
attestation mechanism to improve the customers’ 
confidence on CSP. Ref. [25] shows how to design the 
Trusted SaaS Platform (TSP) by taking advantage of 
trusted computing technologies. Conventional trusted 
computing platforms like Terra [78] are able to prevent 
the owner of a physical machine from inspecting or 
interfering with a computation running in a virtual 
machine (VM) that is hosted in the physical machine, and 
thus can effectively secure the computation running in the 
VM. However, these platforms cannot address security 
and trust issues in SaaS environments due to the 
following two reasons. First, they do not specify who will 
launch the VM that is responsible for performing the 
computation. The approach presented in Towards Trusted 
Cloud Computing [79] on Trusted Cloud Computing 
Platform (TCCP) can only be used for IaaS and not 
suitable for SaaS environments. In TCCP, the protocols 
are mainly utilized for node registration and securing VM 
launch and migration. However, in SaaS system, the 
users’ main purpose is guaranteeing that the SaaS 
providers process their data and respond with the result 
without inspection or modification, rather than 
guaranteeing the security of their VMs.  To address this 
problem, [25] proposed a trusted SaaS platform that 
enables a trusted third party to launch a VM as a trusted 
execution environment(TEE) on the computation server. 
Thus though the privileged administrators of SaaS 
providers can access the physical host of TEE, they 
cannot access the TEE because the TEE is not launched 
by them. The TSP leverages the trusted virtual machine 
monitor (TVMM) [78] so privileged administrators 
cannot tamper with the TEE. The TEE is also where all of 
the decryption, computation and encryption take place, so 
it can ensure the confidentiality and integrity of users’ 
data and computations outsourced to SaaS services.  
3.4.1.5 Cloud Service Deployment Approaches 
Reference [69] has devised five reference deployment 
models for cloud computing that progressively address 
user security concerns and increase users’ trust in cloud 
computing. These are the separation model, availability 
model, migration model, tunnel model, and encryption 
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model. The Separation Model is the base model for all 
the other four models. It separates data storage from data 
processing, requiring at least two independent cloud 
service providers to process data and to store data, 
respectively. This can help ease users’ concerns on 
having a single provider in complete control over the data 
and the services they use. The Availability Model 
introduces redundancy into the Separation Model, in both 
the data processing and the data storage. With the 
redundancy in the Availability Model, failures of one 
data processing service and one data storage service can 
be tolerated. The Tunnel Model further enhances the 
Separation Model by using a Tunnel Service to impose 
isolation between the Data Processing Service and the 
Cloud Storage Service. The Tunnel Service prevents 
collusion by cutting the direct communications between 
the Data Processing Service and the Cloud Storage 
Service, assuming that it is very unlikely for two isolated 
providers to collude. The Cryptography Model augments 
the Tunnel Model with cryptography support, such as 
data encryption, decryption, and digital signing.  
Even though there are approaches to provide 
confidentiality for the users’ data in the Cloud, these are 
not widely adopted due to both awareness and usability 
issues. Therefore, [34] proposed the Confidentiality as a 
Service (CaaS) paradigm to provide usable 
confidentiality and integrity for the bulk of users for 
whom the current security mechanisms are too complex 
or require too much effort. The CaaS paradigm combines 
data security with usability by design and integrates 
effortlessly into available cloud service applications and 
workflows. They leverage the splitting of trust between 
the cloud service provider and one or more CaaS 
providers to improve usability. CaaS focuses on 
unobtrusive confidentiality by hiding all cryptographic 
artifacts from the prevalently non-technical users [34]. 
3.4.2 Service Provider Oriented Trust Engineering 
This facilitates building trust between the cloud 
service providers and their customers in ensuring that 
their resources and administrative platforms will not be 
abused by the consumers. 
3.4.2.1 Reputation Based Approaches 
Reference [50] considers the scenario where a service 
provider, termed the Master Service Provider (MSP),  
identifies a great business opportunity or other scenarios 
which need collaboration with other service providers, 
termed Guest Service Providers (GSP), to offer a set of 
new services to the customers. Their approach is to derive 
trustworthiness of guest service provider i (GSPi) 
according to its past behavior.  
3.4.2.2 Identity and Access Management  
Identity management is one of the core components in 
cloud privacy and security and can help alleviate some of 
the user trust issues associated with cloud computing. 
Available solutions use trusted third party in identifying 
entities to service providers. The solution providers do 
not recommend the usage of their solutions on untrusted 
hosts. Ref. [33] has proposed an approach for identity 
management  that is independent of trusted third parties 
and has the ability to use identity data on untrusted hosts. 
The approach is based on the use of predicates over 
encrypted data and multi-party computing for negotiating 
a use of a cloud service. It uses active bundle - which is a 
middleware agent that includes PII, privacy policies, a 
virtual machine that enforces the policies, and has a set of 
protection mechanisms to protect it. An active bundle 
interacts on behalf of a user to authenticate to cloud 
services using user’s privacy policies. 
3.4.3 Final Remarks  
Ref. [80] has argued that cryptography alone can’t 
enforce the privacy demanded by common cloud 
computing services, even with such powerful tools as 
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). They formally 
define a hierarchy of natural classes of private cloud 
applications, and show that no cryptographic protocol can 
implement those classes where data is shared among 
clients.  
Employing trusted computing technologies and 
reputation based approaches are two key approaches to 
trust engineering in cloud computing marketplace. Also 
the adopted cloud deployment model plays a significant 
role in improving trust in cloud environments.   
3.5 Trust Management Systems  
Trust management is the activity of creating systems 
and methods that allow relying parties to make 
assessments and decisions regarding the dependability of 
potential transactions involving risk, and that also allow 
players and system owners to increase and correctly 
represent the reliability of themselves and their systems 
[81]. There is a need for methodologies that enable 
relying parties to determine the trustworthiness of remote 
parties through computer mediated communication and 
collaboration. At the same time, trustworthy entities need 
methodologies that enable them to be recognized as such; 
developing and applying these methodologies can be 
called trust management. 
A survey on the trust management systems 
implemented on distributed systems with  emphasis on 
cloud computing has been carried out by [52] . They 
reported on several trust models such as CuboidTrust [53] 
, EigenTrust[54] , Bayesian Network based Trust 
Management (BNBTM) [55], GroupRep[56] , AntRep[57] 
, Global Trust[58] [59] , Peer Trust [60], and Trust Ant 
Colony System (TACS)[61]. These models were mainly 
proposed for systems like clusters, grids and wireless 
sensor networks, and have not been used or tested in 
cloud computing environments; hence their suitability for 
use in cloud computing cannot be recommended without 
an extensive evaluation. Though a few work on trust 
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targeting cloud computing environments were considered 
in [52], it was found that none of the proposed systems 
was based on solid theoretical foundation and also does 
not take any quality of service attribute into account for 
forming the trust scores. This observation may be due in 
part to the fact that, although the considered studies dealt 
with elements of trust in cloud computing and hence will 
pass for approaches to trust engineering in cloud 
computing, these were not really trust management 
systems since they do not possess elements for the 
generic operations of trust management systems which 
include expectation, data monitoring, data management, 
analysis, and decision making. Secondly, this observation 
is also partly due to the fact that the concept of trust itself 
is still not well understood by the research community 
due to its loose usage without formal specification. Hence 
a solid formulation of the concept of trust is essential for 
the research community, and more especially in the 
context of cloud computing in order to lay solid 
theoretical foundation for building trust management 
systems for cloud computing. 
Some of the trust related works in cloud computing 
that have provided some generic methodologies in 
developing trust management systems for cloud 
computing environments are [49] and [24]. The generic 
operations of trust management include expectation, data 
monitoring, data management, analysis, and decision 
making. Separation of these operations supports data 
privacy, confidentially and integrity, where data can be 
kept at their sources and accessed only on a need to know 
basis[49]. The model builds trust using the four 
parameters: intent, integrity, capability and results. Intent 
constitutes information about declared agendas about 
what entities promise to provide through their services. 
Integrity constitutes information about honesty which is a 
measure of, to what extent entities deliver on what they 
promised. Capability constitutes information about 
owned or outsourced resources; and finally, results 
constitute information about products and services that 
entities specialized in through consistently delivering 
these products and services satisfactorily to their clients. 
3.5.1 Final Remarks on Trust Management Systems 
The current state-of-the-art in trust management 
systems are that, they are mainly for peer-to-peer 
systems. Secondly, current trust systems provide no 
separation of concern among different trust management 
operations. Also most current trust management systems 
provide limited or no customization according to trusting 
entities’ requirements. The focus is skewed towards 
service providers being evaluated by service consumers 
for their trustworthiness, but not vice versa[49]. In 
addition to designing trust management systems that 
factor in the above mentioned points, the solid 
formulation of the concept of trust is essential for the 
research community, and more especially in the context 
of cloud computing in order to lay solid theoretical 
foundation for building trust systems for cloud computing 
environments. 
4 CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
This work has reviewed identified primary studies on 
trust engineering approaches in cloud computing. The 
central motivating objective of this work has been to lay 
the foundation for designing a trust management system 
for OCS platforms, and provide summary of trust 
engineering approaches in cloud computing for easy 
reference by the research community. The study has been 
specifically interested in finding the main approaches 
towards trust engineering in cloud computing, the 
objectives of the identified primary studies and in what 
contexts these trust management systems are being 
developed; and finally, the major trust models and trust 
management systems for cloud computing.  
It was observed that trusted computing technologies 
and reputation based approaches are the main approaches 
to trust engineering in cloud computing. Also trusted 
third party approaches and the deployment model play a 
significant role in enhancing trust between service 
providers and consumers.  
Based on the findings during the study, the main 
arrears of trust engineering research focus has been on 
quality of service, security, access and identity 
management, user support on trust management, and 
accountability in in the context of a cloud computing 
marketplace .  
We observed that the concept of trust is used loosely 
without any formal specification in cloud computing 
discussions and trust engineering in general. As a first 
step towards addressing this problem, we have 
contextualized the formal trust specification in multi-
agent environments for cloud computing. This should 
prove very useful for other researchers interested in trust 
related research in a cloud computing marketplace. 
The findings in this paper have been applied in the 
design of a trust management system for opportunistic 
cloud services [82]. We will as part of our future work, 
expand on the concept of composite (group) trust, and 
provide suitable formal specification and definition for it.  
5  LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
There could be a possible bias of the authors during 
the practical screening process towards selecting relevant 
primary studies based on personal interest in studies that 
are based on concepts similar to that of opportunistic 
cloud services. This is because since the central 
motivating objective of this work is to lay the foundation 
for designing a trust management system for 
opportunistic cloud services platforms, studies that have 
elements of concepts similar to that this are of interest to 
the authors. With this concern in mind from the 
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beginning of this work, deliberate steps were however 
taken to ensure that this inherent bias does not affect the 
selection of the included primary studies.   
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